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STATUTORY COMMENT
VIRGINIA TAKES NEW APPROACH
TO THE UNINSURED MOTORIST
The Virginia General Assembly at its 1958 session came up with a
new plan for dealing with the uninsured motorist and his traffic
victims.1 Although the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council had
recommended the adoption of the New Jersey Plan of an Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund,2 this recommendation was rejected in
favor of a plan based on use of the uninsured Motorist Rider, which
has given optional coverage under the ordinary liability policy.3
The first state to take any action whatsoever was Massachusetts,
which adopted a compulsory liability plan in 1925. 4 Similar legisla-
tion became effective in New York in 19575 and in North Carolina in
1958.6 This type of plan eliminates the problem of the resident unin-
sured motorist, but not that of the nonresident uninsured driver. Non-
residents could be reached only with costly and unpopular points of en-
:try check stations. A second objection to compulsory liability insurance
is that it gives no pr9tection to the victim of a hit and run driver.
Another approach was developed in New Jersey which utilizes an
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund.7 This plan provides coverage
"Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-58i(b) (Supp. 1958). For a full understanding of the
Virginia Plan, the following Code sections must be considered and analyzed: 12-65;
12-66; 12-67; 38.1-381; 46.1-167.1; 46.1-167.2; 46.1-167.3; 46.1-167.4; 46.1-167.5;
46.1-167.6.
'The problem of the Irresponsible Motorist-A report of the Virginia Advisory
Legislative Council to the Governor and The General Assembly of Virginia 1957.
The New Jersey Plan is cited and discussed in the text at n. 7 infra.
'For example, see The Travellers Insurance and Indemnity Company's Stand-
ard Family Protection Coverage Endorsement 4o93:
"I. Damages for Bodily Injury Caused by Uninsured Automobiles
"To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an un-
insured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury', sustained by the in-
sured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use
of such uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this endorsement,
determination as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled
to recover such damages, and if so tlae amount thereof, shall be made by agree-
ment between the insured or-such representative and the company or, if they
fail to agree, by arbitration."
'Mass. Gen. Laws ch. go, § iA (1954).
5N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 93 through 93-K.
6N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-3o9 through 2o-319 (Supp. 1957).
'N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:6-61 through 39:6-91 (Supp. 1957).
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in the two instances that compulsory liability insurance does not
reach.8 New Jersey assesses a special registration fee that is earmarked
for the fund;9 if the automobile is uninsured, the fee is higher.10 Any
deficiency in the fund is made up from assessments against the in-
surers doing business in New Jersey on the basis of their premium
income from such business within the state." Each year's fee is de-
termined on the past year's experience and subject to maximum limi-
tations.12 The fund so created is held in trust to provide a source
from which collision victims can collect on judgments which other-
wise would not be satisfied.1
3
The Virginia Plan requires every policy of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage liability insurance issued or delivered in the Common-
wealth to contain a clause wherein the coverage under the policy is
extended to protect the insured to the extent of legal damages suf-
fered from a wrongdoer who is an uninsured motorist and not finan-
cially responsible.' 4 This fund is subject to the control of the State
Corporation Commission.' 5 The Commission will authorize annual
payments from the fund to the insurers doing business in Virginia
in the proportion to their premium income from the new mandatory
clause. 16 In this way it is hoped that uninsured motorists will be re-
quired to pay substantially all of the premium increase imposed on in-
sured drivers due to the increased risks covered by the mandatory
clause required by the statute.' 7 A further purpose, expressly stated
in the act, is to encourage motorists to secure liability insurance.
A peculiar situation will be created by application of the Virginia
Plan. By the very nature of the Plan the insurer would seem to have
an adverse interest to that of the insured whenever the latter is
"Id. §§ 39:6-78 through 39:6-81.
11d. § 39:6-63(a).
""Id. § 3 9 :6-63 (b).
"Id. § 39:6-63(c).
1Id. § 3 9 :6-63 (d).
"Id. § 39:6-88.
"Va. Code Ann. § 3 8.i-3 8s(b) (Supp. 1958): "Nor shall any such policy or
contract be so issued or delivered unless it contains an endorsement or provision
undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle,
within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of § 46-455, as amended
from time to time, of the Code herein. Such endorsement or provisions shall also
provide for no less than five thousand dollars coverage for injury to or destruction
of the property of the insured in any one accident but may provide an exclusion of
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damaged by an uninsured motorist.18 Although the insurer is sub-
rogated to the rights of the insured against the uninsured motorist to
the extent the insurer has paid the insured, 19 this will not eliminate
the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured since
these subrogation rights will in most cases prove worthless under the
Virginia Plan. This is true because the insurer seems to be liable to
the insured under the new clause only when the uninsured motorist
has been proved to be financially irresponsible. Thus, when an
uninsured driver, who is financially irresponsible, is involved in a
collision with an insured motorist, the insurer of the latter would
be interested in a finding of no liability in favor of the uninsured
driver, thereby relieving itself of its obligation to the insured motorist
under the mandatory clause of the policy.
Other problems may also present themselves. The statute expressly
states that the insured, in order to bring himself within the manda-
tory clause and establish the liability of his insurer, may not be re-
quired to do more than to establish the legal liability of the unin-
sured motorist,20 and further provides that the right of the insured
party to the collision to employ his own counsel and pursue whatever
legal remedies he may have cannot be restricted by the insurance
contract itself;2 ' therefore, a question arises as to the extent to which
the application of the standard cooperation and settlement clauses in
such policies is limited by the Virginia statute. Another interesting
problem will arise when an insured motorist is damaged by another
driver who is also seemingly protected by insurance, but whose in-
surance cariier has disclaimed coverage under the policy. Under the
Virginia statute, Driver, whose Carrier has disclaimed, would be
classified as an uninsured driver for the purposes of the statute.
22
The position of Motorist's Insurer would seem to be anomalous. This
Insurer would be benefited by a finding of no liability in favor of
Driver. However, if Motorist is successful in obtaining a judgment es-
tablishing the legal liability of Driver, certainly Insurer would have
an interest in Driver's subsequent action against Carrier to establish
the legal liability of the latter under the policy in question. This is
so because if Driver is successful in this second action against Carrier,
I Wrhe definitions of the words "Insured," "Insured Motor Vehicle" and "Un-







then Insurer will not have to pay Motorist under the uninsured
motorist clause of the policy. Thus, the action by Driver "against Car-
rier also indirectly establishes the legal liability of Insurer to Motorist.
How much participation will be allowed to Insurer in this second
action by Driver against Carrier remains to be seen'. Nevertheless, it
is certainly clear that both insurance companies, Insurer and Carrier,
would benefit by a finding of no liability in favor of Driver in the
original action brought by Motorist.
Similarly, when an insured motorist is damaged by any vehicle
whose owner or operator is not known, The Virginia Plan provides
that the insured's action be styled against "John Doe" and process
be served on the damaged motorist's insurer as if the latter were a
party defendant.23 Thereafter, the insurer may defend the action and
take whatever action the law would have permitted "John Doe."
Moreover, the statute expressly states that a judgment against "John
Doe," which is thereafter paid by the insurer, is not a bar to a sec-
ond action by the insured against "John Doe," whenever his identity
becomes known.24 As the insurer is subrogated to the extent it has
paid the insured following the original action, the first dollars re-
covered by the insured in the second action up to the amount he has
been previously paid will belong to the insurer.25 The statute does
not appear to contemplate, at least in express language, that the
insurer will have a similar right to sue the now known uninsured
motorist. Has the statute cut off the subrogation rights of the insurer
to the extent he has paid, or may he come into the second action by
the insured as a party plaintiff? The last approach will probably be
taken by the courts since the statute does not provide for subrogation
and because independent suits against the wrongdoer by both in-
sured and insurer would result in the splitting of a cause of action.
Any other approach would make the right of subrogation given by
the statute meaningless. The course of action suggested here would
create an ethics problem, nevertheless, if the same attorneys who de-
fended the first action against "John Doe" again represented the in-
surer in this second suit.20 Similarly, the correlative rights of the three
OlId. 38.i-38i(e) .
"id. 38.i-381(f ) .
zIbid.
OSee the Canons of Professional Ethics:
"6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests.
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with
the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
1959]
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parties involved against each other, when patently negligent cases are
made by the insurer on behalf of "John Doe" or by the insured in the
second action against the now known wrongdoer, may well result in
future litigation in order to establish what duties each owes to the
other, if any.
It seems relatively safe to predict that much future litigation
can be anticipated in order to set out precisely what this statute
does and does not require or achieve.
Virginia also allows separate suits for property damages and per-
sonal injuries arising out of the same accident and does not condemn
this to be the splitting of a cause of action.27 But the majority of jur-
isdictions are contrary and this consideration would have to be recog-
nized by other legislatures which might adopt a plan in accord with
the one promulgated by the Virginia General Assembly.
25
A more far-reaching plan than any of these actually adopted
by the states has been advanced by Leon Green in his book, Traffic
Victims-Tort Law and Insurance.2 9 Professor Green in this book
undertakes "to demonstrate the obsolescence and futility of common
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrects or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or
employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed."
"7. Confidences of a Client.
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty out-
lasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither
of them should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or
use of these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his em-
ployees or to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent,
and even though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer
should not continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents
the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the truth
in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime
is not included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He may proper-
ly make such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those
against whom it is thfeatened." See also, 36 A.BAJ. 733 (i95o); Note, 13 U. Chi.
L Rev. 1o5 (1945); Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. io4 (1948).
2 Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. i, 52 S.E.2d 1935 (1949).
2"See Note, 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 114 at n. 8 (x957). See also, Note 15 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 316 (1958).
"Concerned with the ever increasing. taffic accident problem, this short mono-
graph had its origin in two earlier-lectures given by the author at the Cincinnati
College of Law under the Robert S. Marx Foundation in 1956 and again in their
final form at the Northwestern University School of Law under the Julius Rosen-
thal Foundation in 1958.
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law jury trial and liability insurance as a remedy for traffic casualties,
and advocates compulsory comprehensive loss insurance as a substi-
tute."3 0
Although finding merit in jury trial and negligence law in what he
terms the "simpler activities," Green feels that negligence law in the
traffic aspect has become outdated due to the complexity of the
factual situation involved in the cases.31 He turns to Workmen's
Compensation legislation to show an analogous need and result, and
to establish his present proposal by a parity of reasoning.3
2
Basically, his solution, which admittedly did not originate with
him, is compulsory loss insurance as distinguished from compulsory
liability insurance.33 He would provide such loss insurance as an
incident of registering an automobile and would continue it for the
vehicle's duration. 34 The state Insurance Commission would act in
a supervisory capacity over administration, classification of the ve-
hicles for rates, and all other relevant matters.35 The commission would
also have the dual responsibility of providing maximum protection to
the public and offering the insurers a fair return. 36 The coverage under
this plan would be complete-extending to the vehicle, its owner, oper-
ator, occupants and any other vehicles, persons or property injured or
suffering damages from collision, fire, theft or any other risk incidental
to the operation of a motor vehicle.3 7 The ordinary rules of damages
would be applicable with the exception that there would be no re-
covery allowable for pain and suffering.38 All claims would be paid in
full unless the amount of coverage proved insufficient, in which case
the claims would be paid proportionately.39 The truly significant part
of the concept is that the only issues involved would be whether the
claimant suffered any injury due to the operation of a motor vehicle,
the extent and amount of his damages, and possibly the identity of the
vehicle itself.
40
Masters would be utilized in order to expedite the cases and to
81Green, Trafffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance 5.
311d. at 64, 8o.
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give them more thorough consideration. 41 These masters would not be
bound by the ordinary rules of evidence and could call their own
witnesses.4 2 Moreover, they would have to approve all settlements
made between the parties, and if necessary, modify any such agree-
ment prior to submitting it to the court for approval.
4 3
This much is certain-the several states are faced with finding
some solution to the problems pointed out by Leon Green. His point
is a valid one. With 70 million motor vehicles estimated to be oper-
ating in 196o, these problems can be expected to become even more
acute.4 4 While it is doubtful that few legislatures, if any, would take
as extreme an approach as suggested by Green-insurance of the ve-
hicle rather than the individual-it is less doubtful that each must
take some approach if a remedy is to be found. The Virginia Plan has
a practical advantage in that it uses the insurance companies to fa-
cilitate carrying it out, rather than assessing them so that the State
itself operates the plan as in New Jersey. The Virginia approach is
less likely to meet resistance and its adoption may thus be more feas-
ible than other more far-reaching schemes. If it proves to be workable,
when clarified by judicial decision, it may become more widespread
in the future.
LEONARD C. GREENEBAUM
"Id at 97.
OId. at go.
"Id. at 91.
"Id. at 85.
